Will the Falklands debacle soon be repeated?

[AndyD]

Andy,
So far the most interesting and intelligent - stupidity lacking argument Ive read.
I thank you for refreshing my neurons.
One question ...
183something argentina.
Can we , consider argentina to be a nation ? or a group of warring states ?
Im not arguing your point at all , nor am I refutting anything you wrote , on the contrary , what you wrote made me think.... Can argentina at the time ( 183somthing) actually be considered a constituted nation ?

Thanks Fabe. That's a good question. As far as I understand, before the UN, the recognition from foreign powers was a crucial element in the constitution of nation states, particularly if we're talking about foreign-policy matters with the power that had or hadn't recognized the state. In 1825, the UK recognized the mandate of Buenos Aires as representative of the independent United Provinces of the River Plate, there's a copy of the (biligual) treaty here:

http://tratados.cancilleria.gob.ar/tratado_archivo.php?id=7728&tipo=1

There were precedents, like the appointment of a British consul to Buenos Aires in 1823 and correspondence between British authorities where they refer to the River Plate region as an independent state, plus you can see that the text refers to itself as a mere formalization of an existing relationship. The UK maintained relations and never rectified that recognition.

The name 'Argentine Republic' was used since 1813 (if I'm not mistaken) as a synonym for the United Provinces of the River Plate, though it became the preferred term only later on, with the 1853 Constitution IIRC, which claims to be the continuity of the U.P. because they are interchangeable names. This is not an issue.

The most critical period for the union of the Argentine nation was 1820-1826, plus a short period following Rivadavia's resignation, when she lacked a central authority due to the defeat of the Buenos Aires government in the battle of Cepeda. Yet, throughout the civil war, the parties identified themselves as part of the national union, or at least those of significance did, as they had done since 1813, with the exceptions of Paraguay and Uruguay, who eventually succeeded in earning their recognition as independent states, and a short-lived secessionist failed attempt in Entre Rios, as far as I know. For example, less than a month after Cepeda, the victors and Buenos Aires signed the Treaty of Pilar, where they proclaimed the national union and organized efforts to reestablish a central government. The dispute was about the form of government, not about the existence of the nation.

During this civil war, Buenos Aires assumed foreign relations in representation of that national identity, even when some provinces didn't recognize her jurisdiction for domestic affairs. I'm not sure how much of that mandate was de-jure or if it was purely de-facto, I mean, with the tacit acceptance of the provinces who didn't complain about acts like those we're discussing here. In any case, what's important for the dispute of the islands is that the UK acknowledged it.

Gustafson says that an author questioned the authority of Buenos Aires to send someone (Jewett) to claim the islands in the name of the nation as early as 1820. Yet, he makes the point that, even if that challenge was valid, Jewett's mandate was perfected when his acts were confirmed by the authority that was recognized by the UK (as an independent state acting in the name of the United Provinces). I guess it's like when sailors claimed islands they discovered in the name of states that didn't know about the islands at the time of their appointment.

It can be said that Argentina took a stable political form in 1860 (under the 1853 Constitution, which was not the first one), or that she achieved her national union at the time, or we can use other words, but to assert that she didn't exist as a nation state before that time is absurd, particularly if we're referring to an issue with the UK, who recognized her in the early 1820s at the epitome of her internal disputes. This is not an issue, or at least I never heard of it other than in a pro-Falkland self-published text that has been promoted via the Internet, where a lot of ill arguments are accumulated as if quantity could replace proper grounds. Please don't get me wrong, I'm not criticizing your question but that text by Pepper and Pascoe. Unfortunately, it's kind of long to answer to each of their arguments.

Edit: I corrected the year of the Constitution and that of national unity.

Matt, thanks for your message too, I'll answer it later.

 

[captainmcd]

Andy D and Matt84, I agree with Fabe that your research and writing on the subject has been informative, and the best I have seen on the subject. It is a shame that politicians on both sides of this issue can not sit down and learn about what is the truth and come to some sort of peaceful agreement on what to do about it. The islands themselves are of little value, but as has been stated, the natural resources of the entire region that have overlapping and conflicting claims should be settled for the betterment of everyone.

 

[AndyD]

But how am I to believe that there was an actual "Argentine" or at least criollo settlement in the Malouines in 1833 when everywhere I read that the frontier was set at Rio Saladillo, some 100 miles from Buenos Aires, until Rosas accomplished that first Campaign del Desierto?

In my view it simply doesn't add up.

Matt, I believe the failure to settle in Patagonia was due to incursions by the Amerindians, which, as we know, were not present in the islands. I was still hoping to find some coastal settlement working at the time, so I searched in Charles Darwin's "The Voyage of the Beagle". The settlements he found were abandoned, but he writes:

' December 23rd. [1833] —We arrived at Port Desire, situated in lat. 47°, on the coast of Patagonia. The creek runs for about twenty miles inland, with an irregular width. The Beagle anchored a few miles within the entrance, in front of the ruins of an old Spanish settlement. [. . . ] In such a country the fate of the Spanish settlement was soon decided; the dryness of the climate during the greater part of the year, and the occasional hostile attacks of the wandering Indians, compelled the colonists to desert their half-finished buildings. [. . . ] The result of all the attempts to colonise this side of America south of 41° has been miserable. Port Famine expresses by its name the lingering and extreme sufferings of several hundred wretched people, of whom one alone survived to relate their misfortunes. At St. Joseph's Bay, on the coast of Patagonia, a small settlement was made; but during one Sunday the Indians made an attack and massacred the whole party, excepting two men, who remained captives during many years. At the Rio Negro I conversed with one of these men, now in extreme old age.' (p. 174)

About the islands he says:

'On March 1st, 1833, and again on March 16th, 1834, the Beagle anchored in Berkeley Sound, in East Falkland Island. [. . . ] After the possession of these miserable islands had been contested by France, Spain, and England, they were left uninhabited. The government of Buenos Ayres then sold them to a private individual, but likewise used them, as old Spain had done before, for a penal settlement. England claimed her right an seized them.'

I interpret he's referring to the abandonment of Spanish colony in 1811, jumping straight to the commercial concessions awarded to Vernet, which were probably in exchange of money, then to the mission of José María Pinedo, who sailed with the new governor Esteban Mestivier to repair the damage to the settlement following the Lexington incident and, IIUC, took convicts for labor, to finalize with the 1833 seizure.

Authoritative historiography is clear about Vernet acting under the Argentine flag to build a colony. For example, I quote from Reisman's "The Struggle for the Falklands", published by Yale Law School:

'By 1820, however, the Vice-Royalty had broken away from Spain and the new government of the United Provinces or Argentina, as it was later called, was secure enough to establish its control over the Falklands. The Argentinians appointed a governor three years later and established a colony in 1826. In 1829, the new governor of the Falklands, Louis Vernet, tried to protect his fishing monopoly by excluding foreign fishing vessels from waters surrounding the Falklands.' (p. 299)

Or Gustafson, published, as I said before, by Oxford University:

'In 1823 the new [Argentine] government gave a concession of land on East Falkland to Don Jorge Pacheco and Louis Vernet. Their first expedition failed to establish a cattle and fishing business, largely because foreign vessels did not recognize them as having exclusive rights to the business. Britain recognized the new government in 1825 without making any reservations about Argentina's attempts to exercise its sovereignty over the Malvinas. By this failure to protest Jewitt's or Vernet's acts of possession in the name of the new republic, the 2 February 1825 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation weakened England's claim. Britain did not protest when Vernet's second expedition to the islands in 1826 succeeded' (p. 22)

Even Freedman's "The Official History of the Falklands Campaign" says (p. 6) 'The creation of the Argentine colony was largely free enterprise on Vernet’s part', so was the colony Argentine or not?

I don't know how reliable it is, but the narrative in Ellms's "Robinson Crusoe's own book", published in 1842, details Jewett's proclaim as witnessed by British Capt. Weddel (for this reason and the publication of the proclaim around Europe it is that the UK must have known and could have protested, then or at the time of the 1823 and 1825 treaties, but didn't) and then goes into the concessions to Vernet starting in 1823, including details about his settlement prior to the destruction done by the USS Lexington. According to the author, the British seized the island while Buenos Aires and the US were discussing reparations from that incident. Due to lack of knowledge, or whatever other reasons, the author omitted Pinedo & Mestivier's mission to repair the settlement.

I believe it is productive to doubt as you did, but there is an explanation with the incursions of the Amerindians and the literature clearly supports that Vernet had settled the islands in the name of the Argentine nation, besides other acts of sovereignty like Jewett's.

 

[Matt84]

Andy, thank you very much for all this clear information delivered in such a reasonable even rational way. If only Argentine diplomats were as reasonable as you this issue would be settled by now. But of course why would the Argentine Government want this issue settled? As someone cleverly said in some of the other four threads currently active on the topic, the Malvinas Argentinas are worth a lot more in political capital as long as they stay under British control, than they would be worth (or cost...) if Argentina anschlüssed them.

The Argentine people of course would benefit more than one way if this was settled. For starters this tension is very bad for business, but it's not just about money, it's also about Argentine not being able to be "patriotic" and rational or humane at the same way. I say this because whatever the legal outcome, the people who inhabit those islands have a right to their land, to their world, and certainly are not guilty of whatever happened in 1833.

Matt, I believe the failure to settle in Patagonia was due to incursions by the Amerindians, which, as we know, were not present in the islands.

Failure? It took its due time for civilization to expand to the farthest corners of the Americas and its interior. Argentina has an example of both kind of frontiers one in Patagonia and the inner one in the greater Chaco. I wouldn't call it a failure, Brazil is still doing it, and purposefully halting the process (for preservation) in Amazonas.
And as it took time it seems only reasonable that it would eventually (Patagonia) be settled by the peoples that most frequent its shores and the closest nations in formation.
Considering most of the Pampas were considered "el desierto" or part of Patagonia back then, I'm surprised the British didn't take Tierra del Fuego, but then I remember Fuerte Bulnes and my point about the Pacific, Chilean, coast of Patagonia, having enough inlets, fjords and islands to cultivate a more seafaring disposition in the natives, criollos and newcomers.

Even Freedman's "The Official History of the Falklands Campaign" says (p. 6) 'The creation of the Argentine colony was largely free enterprise on Vernet’s part', so was the colony Argentine or not?

Only as long as you consider a couple of government contracts and failed enterprises more relevant than 100+ years of permanent settlement.

Even if you were right about the islands being illegally taken away from the United Provinces according to 1830s international law (!) - the islands have remained British for more than a century, it's not a military or scientific outpost like France's Kerguelen, people live there and raise their children and sheep there. No government can handle them, or their town, to a country they have nothing in common with, it would be as inhumane as suddenly deporting thousands because of some 19th century legal technicality. It is the exact opposite case as Hong Kong.

Argentina, when formed under that name, welcomed the British with open arms, and the UK for almost a century, recognized and invested in the new country as if it were a Crown Colony. It went both ways: During the Boer War, Argentine horses were sent to South Africa as a token of solidarity. The Falklnds issue seemed not to have been of importance to the Argentine Gov during that time.

But before and after that "Golden" period (1853-1930) the FLs remained that chip in the shoulder of the Populist governments, a cheap card to bring every time instability is sensed.

Regarding natural resources there are many in Antarctica, and it would be better for Argentina if it settled its dispute with Britain before the treaty expires. The claimed zones by Chile, Argentina and teh UK keep overlapping.

As a matter of fact, the reason why the Argentine section is so small is because those three uninhabited islands south of Cape Horn that Argentina peacefully ceded to Chile after the Vatican mediated.

Gosh the Falkla'ds really are political capital! They allow even the staunchest Argentine patriot to overlook how this country has been constantly losing territory since its inception.

 

[AndyD]

Matt, thank you for the details you're bringing, so far I have only pointed out those that I disagree with, which nevertheless provide an opportunity too look into the subject, while other details that I leave unanswered I find accurate and insightful. By the way, captainmcd, thank you too for your kind words.

If only Argentine diplomats were as reasonable as you this issue would be settled by now. But of course why would the Argentine Government want this issue settled? As someone cleverly said in some of the other four threads currently active on the topic, the Malvinas Argentinas are worth a lot more in political capital as long as they stay under British control, than they would be worth (or cost...) if Argentina anschlüssed them.

I don't think that's completely fair. You mentioned the case of the Beagle dispute, where the government accepted a settlement that was disappointing in comparison with previous aspirations. They did it in accordance to what the people decided in a referendum, with a colorful televised debate where the government put forward the 'let's accept' proposition.

The state of the islands affair is that the UK is not accepting talks, offering a justification that may be translated into 'our argument (i.e., self determination) is so unquestionable that there's nothing to talk about'. Before the war, the British approaches were, when seen from the Argentine point of view, frustrating too. Given this, I think it's odd to put the responsibility for the stalemate on an hypothetical irrationality of the Argentine diplomats.

We don't know what they would argue at a negotiating table. If they have to follow orders from our current administration they might have to be too rigid, but during Menem's administration, with all the ills of that government, we had intelligent and well-educated diplomats on this issue, like Andres Cisneros, who appears in the media now and then. Even though he's clearly convinced that the islands are Argentine and won't approve a veto for the islanders, I think I remember that he once said that one possibility might be giving one island to each country. I like the idea of the dispute morphing into which island throws the best party.

Let me quote two passages that are not coherent with the idea that the Argentine claim is an irrational proposal from populist governments. Firstly, Freedman's, "The Official History of the Falklands, Vol. 1". He writes in page 9:

Few of those who have examined the historical evidence are confident that the Port Egmont settlement provided a sufficient basis for the seizure of the Islands by Britain. Having perused the papers in 1829, the Duke of Wellington as Prime Minister remarked that it was not clear to him ‘that we have ever possessed the sovereignty of these Islands.' Through the rest of the nineteenth century successive British governments assumed the case to be closed and did not always bother to respond to the occasional Argentine protest. In 1908 the issue suddenly came to a head as a result of Argentine protests at the inclusion of the Falkland Islands as a British possession in the Rome Postal Union Convention. As always Britain rejected the protests but, aware of the coming centenary celebrations in Argentina, decided to investigate the matter further. In 1910, Gaston de Bernhardt, the Foreign Office’s Assistant Librarian, produced a substantial memorandum on the history of the dispute. The effect was to increase respect for the Argentine claim. ‘For more than 60 years we have refused to discuss the question with the Argentine government,’ observed a recipient of the memo, ‘but from a perusal of this memo it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Argentine government’s attitude is not altogether unjustified, and that our action has been somewhat high handed.’

Thus confidence remained at a low ebb for the next couple of decades, not helped by a substantial American analysis supporting the Argentine claim which was published in 1927.

Gustafson writes in page 32 of "The Dispute...":

In 1910, the British Foreign Office began to entertain doubts about the historical right England had to the Falklands that supposedly made the 1833 incident a mere reassertion of right. Some feared that the incident had indeed been unjustified, that conquest, at least in the twentieth century, did not provide title, and that a basis other than historic right and conquest should be emphasized. All of this was precipitated by Argentina's continuing protests. In 1908 Argentina objected to the Rome Postal Union Convention because it included the Falklands as a British possession. In 1910 the Malvinas were frequently mentioned during the centenary celebrations of Argentina's independence. A new generation in the Foreign Office, not surprisingly uninformed about the Falklands, requested that Gaston de Bernhardt, the assistant librarian, write a report on the dispute. The 7 December 1910 forty-nine-page report, according to Peter Beck, "implied various weaknesses in the traditional British case for sovereignty. It began to seem that in 1833 Britain had seized control of a legitimate Argentine possession."

After December 1910 various British diplomats began questioning British title. Gerald Spicer, the head of the Foreign Office's American department, had said in June 1910 that Britain's claim to the Falklands "cannot be seriously contested." On 12 December he said that "from a perusal of this memo it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Argentine Government's attitude is not altogether unjustified, and that our action has been somewhat highhanded." Ronald Campbell, an assistant secretary in the American department, wrote in July 1911 that Buenos Aires, having inherited Spain's title, had the best claim to the Falklands. "We cannot easily make out a good claim," he wrote, "and we have very wisely done everything to avoid discussing the subject with Argentina." After Sir Malcolm Robertson, the British ambassador in Buenos Aires in the late 1920s, read the 1910 report he wrote, that "The Argentine attitude is neither 'ridiculous' nor 'childish.' ... I confess that, until I received that memorandum myself a few weeks ago, I had no idea of the strength of the Argentine case nor of the weakness of ours. ... I had assumed that our right to the Falkland Islands was unassailable. This is very far from being the case."

The British had come to suspect that the Argentine demand for the return of the Malvinas was more than a people's aspiration.

I stress that the first quote if from UK's official historian for the Falklands Campaign and the second is from a book published by Oxford University.

Only as long as you consider a couple of government contracts and failed enterprises more relevant than 100+ years of permanent settlement.

The settlement was not insignificant for the time and it was prospering, unless we consider the attack from USS Lexington as their failure. We don't know what level of development it would have reached if Argentine efforts were left untroubled, without that incident or with it, after the reconstruction efforts that were started. Besides, I feel that building an argument around the destruction by the American ship is like having them do the UK's dirty work. In which way would that episode prove that the Argentine were incapable or unwilling to inhabit the islands?

Besides, with that argument, any power could take land from another country, develop it and then claim it? What if a community inhabiting certain country claims its independence, or their allegiance to another state of their liking, on the basis that they had developed that land? What effect would it have on the attitude towards immigrant communities?

The settlement over time (i.e., acquisitive prescription) is the basis of the British position since around 1930, when they dropped the previous argumentative line based on first landing. The books that I quoted above go on with that argumentative line, attributing importance to it. Yet, this principle normally requires acquiescence from the other part, I think dropping that requirement is not a minor thing at all. If you have the title to a parcel but leave it forgotten, I think it's fair and productive that, after a certain period of time, a proper title is awarded to an occupant who has developed it and visibly acted as a good-faith owner. But not if the previous owners had claims that were ignored, and certainly not if they were being impeded by force to exercise their ownership, even if it's just by means of intimidation with no shots being fired. Acquisitive prescription under such conditions can hardly constitute an argument so unquestionable that it would be irrational and childlike to challenge it.

Even if you were right about the islands being illegally taken away from the United Provinces according to 1830s international law (!) - the islands have remained British for more than a century, it's not a military or scientific outpost like France's Kerguelen, people live there and raise their children and sheep there. No government can handle them, or their town, to a country they have nothing in common with, it would be as inhumane as suddenly deporting thousands because of some 19th century legal technicality. It is the exact opposite case as Hong Kong.

I don't think that it would be inhumane to transfer sovereignty of the islands. According to Argentine law, the islanders are Argentine citizens with full rights, and there are lots of possibilities to explore as part of the negotiation: Ad-hoc laws for them to maintain their official language and customs, in case our constitution doesn't provide those rights already. Lease back so that they need to decide to stay or leave only after one or two generations. Economic aid in case they prefer to emmigrate. British nationality for their children born in the islands. Etc... They're only 2000 people if we don't count the 1000 affected to the naval base, it shouldn't be too hard to offer them guarantees for a better-than-acceptable standard of living. Who's interested in forcing them to drive on the right and such things? If Argentina was bound to preserving customs by a treaty, would she make a clown of herself in the international scene by not complying?

What I'm not sure that an agreement would guarantee for them is the level of confidence they enjoy for the use of fishing licenses (AFAIK, that revenue alone, per capita, more or less doubles the Argentine per capita GDP) plus oil and whatever resources are found, plus the business from the current naval base, which for the time being is economically supported by the people in Great Britain. Still, those issues can be treated in the negotiation. But I wouldn't call it 'inhumane' if they're denied some of those advantages because the talks conclude that they weren't theirs in the first place.

I can understand if, as a conclusion of such a process, the islanders feel troubled, and an effort should be done an all parts to lessen those troubles to a minimum, in the event of a change of sovereignty (which is only one of the possible outcomes of negotiations). But isn't it too much to call that an 'inhumane' treatment?

The illegal or legal status of seizure of foreign land is more than a technicality. The settlers knew they were moving into disputed land. If they were misguided, is the responsibility Argentine or of the British governments that didn't bother to look into the matter before 1910?

As a sidenote, I guess that, in HK, the people probably wanted the UK administration to continue and, even so, it was handed to a government with a doubtful human-rights record. I'm not saying there were better options but let's be clear, it wasn't an example of self determination.

But before and after that "Golden" period (1853-1930) the FLs remained that chip in the shoulder of the Populist governments, a cheap card to bring every time instability is sensed.

After 1930, with the rising of nationalism, the case became more prominent and there was such political use, but there were claims during the 1853-1930 period too. Commerce with UK was strong even before 1853 and I doubt the islands were attributed much importance, although they were claimed. I see this reflected in Rosas offering them in exchange of the cancellation of a loan.

 

[Matt84]

so the Military Junta held a referendum, while not holding elections, to televise an already decided question? nice bit of info! It would have been nice if they had had some similar circus in the FLs case instead of a bloody bloody war.

We don't know what level of development it would have reached if Argentine efforts were left untroubled,

I've been to Tierra del Fuego, can get an idea...

Besides, with that argument, any power could take land from another country, develop it and then claim it? What if a community inhabiting certain country claims its independence, or their allegiance to another state of their liking, on the basis that they had developed that land? What effect would it have on the attitude towards immigrant communities?

That's what was done in the 1800s as you pointed out earlier to my implicit agreement. If you sustained that now you'd be holding a double standard. If you claim the FLs on those grounds then Paraguay can claim Formosa back, and maybe ask for some restitution on grounds of genocide. The counter lawsuits could go on forever in an orgy of cannibalism that would take the entire globalized world. It would be like suing globalization itself.

I don't think that it would be inhumane to transfer sovereignty of the islands. According to Argentine law, the islanders are Argentine citizens with full rights, and there are lots of possibilities to explore as part of the negotiation: Ad-hoc laws for them to maintain their official language and customs, in case our constitution doesn't provide those rights already. Lease back so that they need to decide to stay or leave only after one or two generations. Economic aid in case they prefer to emmigrate. British nationality for their children born in the islands. Etc... They're only 2000 people if we don't count the 1000 affected to the naval base, it shouldn't be too hard to offer them guarantees for a better-than-acceptable standard of living. Who's interested in forcing them to drive on the right and such things? If Argentina was bound to preserving customs by a treaty, would she make a clown of herself in the international scene by not complying?

Allow those 2000 people who have been living there for generations, not the military personnel to decide whether they want to be part of the Argentine Republic or accept that if the future of their sovereignty is not decided by them then it is decided "inhumanely" (unfair, immoral, unlawful)

What I'm not sure that an agreement would guarantee for them is the level of confidence they enjoy for the use of fishing licenses (AFAIK, that revenue alone, per capita, more or less doubles the Argentine per capita GDP) plus oil and whatever resources are found,

You may have a point in Argentina pursuing costly legal battles for EEZ ocean rights, but that can only be discussed once Argentina leaves the people of the FLs alone to decide on themselves whether they want to remain as they are (which is what they seem to consistently want), become an independent micronation like some many other ex British Colonies, or whatever they decide..

As a sidenote, I guess that, in HK, ....

And still in the case of H.K. the people (in % mostly descendants of refugees from communist china) are still allowed a 50 year autonomy stage. The pact with China was rather specific. When Britain had the upper hand it leased the island for a specific number of years. The treaty expired, "fortunately" as China was rising again from a 300 year sleep, and still the people of H.K. are infinitely freer than those of mainland China.

 

[pez]

A little report from the BBC on the British forces in the Malvinas as compared to 1982 / http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17157373

 

[AndyD]

so the Military Junta held a referendum, while not holding elections, to televise an already decided question? nice bit of info! It would have been nice if they had had some similar circus in the FLs case instead of a bloody bloody war.

It wasn't the Junta, it happened during the democratic government of Alfonsin. The process was not a circus, Argentina had to ratify the decision and perfect it through a treaty. Maybe something similar would have happened with the islands if the negotiations of 1960-70 had produced a useful proposal.

That's what was done in the 1800s as you pointed out earlier to my implicit agreement. If you sustained that now you'd be holding a double standard. If you claim the FLs on those grounds then Paraguay can claim Formosa back, and maybe ask for some restitution on grounds of genocide. The counter lawsuits could go on forever in an orgy of cannibalism that would take the entire globalized world. It would be like suing globalization itself.

Some messages above I said that the situation there is different, as there was a treaty followed by 140 years of acquiescence. Any one of those facts would invalidate claims today. Besides, that was an unclear boundary, unlike the islands in 1833. The Chaco territories were disputed and, after the defeat of Paraguay, the parts agreed on sending the matter for US arbitration, who attributed a sizable portion to each country. Argentina accepted even though she was controlling the portion awarded to Paraguay, who was in an otherwise hopeless situation. In any case, what I was arguing is that sovereignty shouldn't be transferred on the grounds of 'we can develop it better than you', which has no relation to this other conflict with Paraguay.

I don't know where that genocide reference comes from. Perhaps you picked up some complaints from ultra-nationalistic revisionism. For example, according to a version, Brazilian commander Caxías had written to his sovereign that he was wondering when they would finish killing every Paraguayan, including women and children. When the original text in Portuguese is consulted, what he was saying is, clearly, that he was wondering how the war would come to an end given the fierceness with which the Paraguayans were fighting, that it looked like all of them would fight to die unless a more humane outcome was contemplated. The normal outcome would have been, of course, that autocrat Solano Lopez surrendered, instead of sending young children and old men to battle, and disregarding the miseries that the hopeless war was producing on his people. Besides, Argentina was practically out of the war during those last phases.

Allow those 2000 people who have been living there for generations, not the military personnel to decide whether they want to be part of the Argentine Republic or accept that if the future of their sovereignty is not decided by them then it is decided "inhumanely" (unfair, immoral, unlawful)

Those are not synonyms, it doesn't help to frivolously hint accusations of inhumane intentions and genocide. On the other hand, I believe that what's under discussion is the lawfulness, fairness and morality of each position, including the challenges to the application of the self determination principle.

You may have a point in Argentina pursuing costly legal battles for EEZ ocean rights, but that can only be discussed once Argentina leaves the people of the FLs alone to decide on themselves whether they want to remain as they are (which is what they seem to consistently want), become an independent micronation like some many other ex British Colonies, or whatever they decide..

Again, you're giving no room to discussing that principle despite the arguments presented. Maybe a sign that we need to agree that we disagree.

And still in the case of H.K. the people (in % mostly descendants of refugees from communist china) are still allowed a 50 year autonomy stage. The pact with China was rather specific. When Britain had the upper hand it leased the island for a specific number of years. The treaty expired, "fortunately" as China was rising again from a 300 year sleep, and still the people of H.K. are infinitely freer than those of mainland China.

So the reasoning is that if a community formally leases a territory, they don't acquire rights after living long and prospering, but if they do the same by squatting then they acquire unquestionable rights? Or is it that all what matters is if one country has the upper hand or if it is rising? Let's call things by their name.

Again, I'm not saying there were better options in HK, but I disagree with presenting it as a sort of counter example. By the way, things like a lease back or ad-hoc autonomy measures are open to discussion.