Fall of the Republic | The Presidency of Barack Obama


Jan 2, 2009
trailer: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HfVjDazB864&feature=related

movie: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F8LPNRI_6T8

Fall Of The Republic documents how an offshore corporate cartel is bankrupting the US economy by design. Leaders are now declaring that world government has arrived and that the dollar will be replaced by a new global currency.

President Obama has brazenly violated Article 1 Section 9 of the US Constitution by seating himself at the head of United Nations' Security Council, thus becoming the first US president to chair the world body.

A scientific dictatorship is in its final stages of completion, and laws protecting basic human rights are being abolished worldwide; an iron curtain of high-tech tyranny is now descending over the planet.

A worldwide regime controlled by an unelected corporate elite is implementing a planetary carbon tax system that will dominate all human activity and establish a system of neo-feudal slavery.

The image makers have carefully packaged Obama as the world's savior; he is the Trojan Horse manufactured to pacify the people just long enough for the globalists to complete their master plan.

This film reveals the architecture of the New World Order and what the power elite have in store for humanity. More importantly it communicates how We The People can retake control of our government, turn the criminal tide and bring the tyrants to justice.
There is an overarching system of media, financial, and military control -- which is the "free world."
break out that tin foil hat! the sky is falling, the end is near!
Dude that's awesome! Please send more conspiracy theory movie links. We love 'em!
bigbadwolf said:
There is an overarching system of media, financial, and military control -- which is the "free world."

.... And if things get too weird, the opposition (us) will hit the streets and the whole sh*t house planet will go up in flames (to kind of steal a line from Jim Morrison) and then Dudester will but a revolver in his mouth and meet BBW on the dark side of the moon (which will still be in one piece)..... So, there's PLAN A..... Plan B coming soon.......

(you know I agree with you BBW, to A POINT. Your watch is closer to midnight than mine) These guys are Tip Toeing, sneaky sneaky is the key, slow and easy is the plan....
Dudester said:
.... And if things get too weird, the opposition (us) will hit the streets and the whole sh*t house planet will go up in flames

Dudester, the system is already firmly in place. The mocha messiah is merely the latest bum boy of this system of oligarchic control. "Resistance is futile" (The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy).
EdRooney said:
Dude that's awesome! Please send more conspiracy theory movie links. We love 'em!

ed, i suggest you actually try watching the movie first rather than immediately and sarcastically dismissing it as "conspiracy theory". that's an all too easy cop out for anybody to do, never bothering to actually look at any of the issues.

some of the same ppl that helped to cause the current financial crisis are the same ppl in power today. we're talking about ppl like Bob Rubin, Larry Summers and of course the ring leader Alan Greenspan. tim geitner is in there as well. think that's a coincidence? this is all by design because the same group that holds power controls both the republican and democratic parties.

a recent Frontline documentary/interview with Brooksley Born came out where she details how she was essentially stonewalled and shut down by rubin, summers and greenspan when she attempted to warn congress and the public about the impending danger/risks.


now i ask you and everybody else. why are these same men and others like them in power today? why is there not a call for the resignation of these criminals? could it be that the real positions of power are the appointed positions and NOT the elected officials?

why is our govt infested with the alumni of goldman sachs, council on foreign relations and the trilateral commission? why is the solution to solve the financial crisis to give even more power to the federal reserve? wasn't the fed reserve put into place in 1913 in order to PREVENT future financial crises? how would you rate their job performance to date?

why, despite everything that has happened, is the financial market still unregulated? why has something similar to the glass steagall act, which these men in power helped to repeal, not been implemented?


Inside The Great American Bubble Machine | Matt Taibbi on how Goldman Sachs has engineered every major market manipulation since the Great Depression
A healthy financial system is crucial to any working market economy. Widespread access to finance is essential to harnessing the best talents and allowing them to prosper and grow. It is crucial for drawing new entrants into the system, and for fostering competition. The system that allocates finance allocates power and rents; if that system is not fair, there is little hope that the rest of the economy can be. And the potential for unfairness or abuse in the financial system is always great.

Americans have long been sensitive to such abuse. While we have historically avoided general anti-capitalist biases, Americans have nonetheless nurtured something of a populist anti-finance bias. This bias has led to many political decisions throughout American history that were inefficient from an economic point of view, but helped preserve the long-term health of America's democratic capitalism.

In the late 1830s, President Andrew Jackson opposed renewing the charter of the Second Bank of the United States — a move that contributed to the panic of 1837 — because he saw the bank as an instrument of political corruption and a threat to American liberties. An investigation he initiated established "beyond question that this great and powerful institution had been actively engaged in attempting to influence the elections of the public officers by means of its money."

Throughout much of American history, state bank regulations were driven by concerns about the power of New York banks over the rest of the country, and the fear that big banks drained deposits from the countryside in order to redirect them to the cities.

To address these fears, states introduced a variety of restrictions: from unit banking (banks could have only one office), to limits on intrastate branching (banks from northern Illinois could not open branches in southern Illinois), to limits on interstate branching (New York banks could not open branches in other states). From a purely economic point of view, all of these restrictions were crazy. They forced a reinvestment of deposits in the same areas where they were collected, badly distorting the allocation of funds. And by preventing banks from expanding, these regulations made banks less diversified and thus more prone to failure. Nevertheless, these policies had a positive side effect: They splintered the banking sector, reducing its political power and in so doing creating the preconditions for a vibrant securities market.

Even the separation between investment banking and commercial banking introduced by the New Deal's Glass-Steagall Act was a product of this longstanding American tradition. Unlike many other banking regulations, Glass-Steagall at least had an economic rationale: to prevent commercial banks from exploiting their depositors by dumping on them the bonds of firms to which the banks had lent money, but which could not repay the loans. The Glass-Steagall Act's biggest consequence, though, was the fragmentation it caused — which helped reduce the concentration of the banking industry and, by creating divergent interests in different parts of the financial sector, helped reduce its political power.

In the last three decades, these arrangements were completely overturned, starting with the progressive deregulation of the banking sector. The restrictions imposed by state regulations were highly inefficient to begin with, but over the years technological and financial progress made them absolutely untenable. What good does it do to restrict branching when banks can set up ATMs throughout the country? How effectively can a prohibition on intrastate branching block the redistribution of deposits, when non-integrated banks can reallocate them through the interbank market?
So starting in the late 1970s, state bank regulations were relaxed or eliminated, increasing the efficiency of the banking sector and fostering economic growth. But the move also increased concentration.

In 1980, there were 14,434 banks in the United States, about the same number as in 1934.

By 1990, this number had dropped to 12,347; by 2000, to 8,315. In 2009, the number stands below 7,100. Most important, the concentration of deposits and lending grew significantly. In 1984, the top five U.S. banks controlled only 9% of the total deposits in the banking sector. By 2001, this percentage had increased to 21%, and by the end of 2008, close to 40%.

The apex of this process was the 1999 passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed the restrictions imposed by Glass-Steagall.

Gramm-Leach-Bliley has been wrongly accused of playing a major role in the current financial crisis; in fact, it had little to nothing to do with it.

The major institutions that failed or were bailed out in the last two years were pure investment banks — such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch — that did not take advantage of the repeal of Glass-Steagall; or they were pure commercial banks, like Wachovia and Washington Mutual. The only exception is Citigroup, which had merged its commercial and investment operations even before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, thanks to a special exemption.

The real effect of Gramm-Leach-Bliley was political, not directly economic.

Under the old regime, commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies had different agendas, and so their lobbying efforts tended to offset one another. But after the restrictions were lifted, the interests of all the major players in the financial industry became aligned, giving the industry disproportionate power in shaping the political agenda. The concentration of the banking industry only added to this power.

The last and most important source of the finance industry's growing power was its profitability, at least on the books.

In the 1960s, the share of GDP produced by the finance sector amounted to a little more than 3%.
By the mid-2000s, it was more than 8%.

This expansion was driven by a rapid increase not only in profits, but also in wages.

In 1980, the relative wage of a worker in the finance sector was roughly comparable to the wages of other workers with the same qualifications in other sectors.

By 2007, the person in the finance sector was making 70% more.

Every attempt to explain this gap using differences in abilities, or the inherent demands of the work, falls short. People working in finance were simply making significantly more than everybody else.
This enormous profitability allowed the industry to spend disproportionate amounts of money lobbying the political system.

In the last 20 years, the financial industry has made $2.2 billion in political contributions, more than any other industry tracked by the Center for Responsive Politics. And over the last ten years, the financial industry topped the lobbying-expenses list, spending $3.5 billion.

The explosion of wages and profits in finance also naturally attracted the best talents — with implications that extended beyond the financial sector, and deep into government.

Thirty years ago, the brightest undergraduates were going into science, technology, law, and business; for the last 20 years, they have gone to finance. Having devoted themselves to this sector, these talented individuals inevitably end up working to advance its interests: A person specialized in derivative trading is likely to be terribly impressed with the importance and value of derivatives, just as a nuclear engineer is likely to think nuclear power can solve all the world's problems. And if most of the political elite were picked from among nuclear engineers, it would be only natural that the country would soon fill with nuclear plants.

In fact, we have an example of precisely this scenario in France, where for complicated cultural reasons an unusually large portion of the political elite is trained in engineering at the École Polytechnique — and France derives more of its energy from nuclear power than any other nation.

A similar effect is evident with finance in America. The proportion of people with training and experience in finance working at the highest levels of every recent presidential administration is extraordinary. Four of the last six secretaries of Treasury fit this description. In fact, all four were directly or indirectly connected to one firm: Goldman Sachs. This is hardly the historical norm; of the previous six Treasury secretaries, only one had a finance background.

And finance-trained executives staff not only the Treasury but many senior White House posts and key positions in numerous other departments. President Barack Obama's chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, once worked for an investment bank, as did his predecessor under President George W. Bush, Joshua Bolten.

There is nothing intrinsically bad about these developments. In fact, it is only natural that a government in search of the brightest people will end up poaching from the finance world, to which the best and brightest have flocked. The problem is that people who have spent their entire lives in finance have an understandable tendency to think that the interests of their industry and the interests of the country always coincide.

When Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson went to Congress last fall arguing that the world as we knew it would end if Congress did not approve the $700 billion bailout, he was serious and speaking in good faith. And to an extent he was right: His world — the world he lived and worked in — would have ended had there not been a bailout. Goldman Sachs would have gone bankrupt, and the repercussions for everyone he knew would have been enormous. But Henry Paulson's world is not the world most Americans live in — or even the world in which our economy as a whole exists. Whether that world would have ended without Congress's bailout was a far more debatable proposition; unfortunately, that debate never took place.

Compounding the problem is the fact that people in government tend to rely on their networks of trusted friends to gather information "from the outside." If everyone in those networks is drawn from the same milieu, the information and ideas that flow to policymakers will be severely limited.

A revealing anecdote comes from a Bush Treasury official, who noted that in the heat of the financial crisis, every time there was a phone call from Manhattan's 212 area code, the message was the same: "Buy the toxic assets." Such uniformity of advice makes it difficult for even the most intelligent or well-meaning policymakers to arrive at the right decisions.
The finance sector's increasing concentration and growing political muscle have undermined the traditional American understanding of the difference between free markets and big business. This means not only that the interests of finance now dominate the economic understanding of policymakers, but also — and perhaps more important — that the public's perception of the economic system's legitimacy is at risk.

If the free-market system is politically fragile, its most fragile component is precisely the financial industry. It is so fragile because it relies entirely on the sanctity of contracts and the rule of law, and that sanctity cannot be preserved without broad popular support. When people are angry to the point of threatening the lives of bankers; when the majority of Americans are demanding government intervention not only to regulate the financial industry but to control the way companies are run; when voters lose confidence in the economic system because they perceive it as fundamentally corrupt — then the sanctity of private property becomes threatened as well. And when property rights are not protected, the survival of an effective financial sector, and with it a thriving economy, is in doubt.

The government's involvement in the financial sector in the wake of the crisis — and particularly the bailouts of large banks and other institutions — has exacerbated this problem. Public mistrust of government has combined with mistrust of bankers, and concerns about the waste of taxpayer dollars have been joined to worries about rewarding those who caused the mess on Wall Street. In response, politicians have tried to save themselves by turning against the finance sector with a vengeance. That the House of Representatives approved a proposal to retroactively tax 90% of all bonuses paid by financial institutions receiving TARP money shows how dangerous this combination of backlash and demagoguery can be.

Fortunately, that particular proposal never became law. But the anti-finance climate that produced it greatly contributed, for instance, to the expropriation of Chrysler's secured creditors this spring. By singling out and publicly condemning the Chrysler creditors who demanded that their contractual rights be respected, President Obama effectively exploited public resentment to reduce the government's costs in the Chrysler bailout. But the cost-cutting came at the expense of current investors, and sent a signal to all potential future investors. While Obama's approach was convenient in the short term, it could prove devastating to the market system over time: The protection afforded to secured creditors is crucial in making credit available to firms in financial distress and even in Chapter 11. The Chrysler precedent will jeopardize access to such financing in the future, particularly for the firms most in need, and so will increase the pressure for yet more government involvement.
The pattern that has taken hold in the wake of the financial crisis thus threatens to initiate a vicious cycle. To avoid being linked in the public mind with the companies they are working to help, politicians take part in and encourage the assault on finance; this scares off legitimate investors, no longer certain they can count on contracts and the rule of law. And this, in turn, leaves little recourse for troubled businesses but to seek government assistance.
It is no coincidence that shortly after bashing Wall Street executives for their greed, the administration set up the most generous form of subsidy ever invented for Wall Street. The Public-Private Investment Program, announced in March by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, provides $84 of government-subsidized loans and $7 of government equity for every $7 of private equity invested in the purchase of toxic assets. The terms are so generous that the private investors essentially receive a subsidy of $2 for every dollar they put in.
If these terms are "justified" by the uncertainty stemming from the populist backlash, they also exacerbate the conditions that generated the backlash in the first place — confirming the sense that government and large market players are cooperating at the expense of the taxpayer and the small investor. If the Public-Private Investment Program works, the very people who created the problem stand to grow fabulously rich with government help — which will surely do no good for the public's impression of American capitalism.
This is just the unhealthy cycle in which capitalism is trapped in most countries around the world. On one hand, entrepreneurs and financiers feel threatened by public hostility, and thus justified in seeking special privileges from the government. On the other hand, ordinary citizens feel outraged by the privileges the entrepreneurs and financiers receive, inflaming that very hostility. For anyone acquainted with the character of capitalism around the world, this moment in America feels eerily familiar.
This movie is just a bunch of sound bites strung together. There maybe some facts in here, there maybe be certain problems outlined & there certainly are serious issues with multinational companies and globalization, etc. But this movie in no way proves the points you think it does.