Aside of the fact it's maybe inelegant to keep using bold chars (you didn't answer about that), you seem to imply that we had a discussion about the price NML bought the bonds for (I may have said "penny on the dollar").
I'd be delighted to look again, unemotionally, at the UK Supreme Court ruling you mentioned (didn't find it but there are many posts). I don't think I bashed you about that, did I? (but I did bash you)
All I hope is to have a positive debate.
I thank you in advance for posting the link to the UK Supreme Court ruling you mentioned (likely escaped me) or one of my post where I bash you about it (?). Maybe I did, I don't remember.
You may find it inelegant to use
bold typeface, so don't, but I use it to emphasize what I find most important.
"This appeal relates to bonds issued by the Republic of Argentina in respect of which, together with all its other debt, Argentina declared a moratorium in December 2001. Between June 2001 and September 2003 affiliates of NML purchased, at a little over half their face value, bonds with a principal value of US$ 172,153,000 (“the bonds”)."
Sovereign immunity in NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina - Supreme Court of the United Kingdom - Judgment
http://www.supremeco...40_Judgment.pdf (p. 3)
The Argentine offer is somewhere in the 374 pages 2005 prospect and in the 267 pages 2010 prospect. I am not in the mood to go through them as I don't remember the exact term to search for. The (actually less than) 30 cents per dollar is, however, a well known fact, e.g.
1. "investors who participated in restructurings in 2005 and 2010, receiving 25 to 29 cents on the dollar."
http://www.buenosair...egotiate-first-
2. "An IMF study calculated that the exchange reduced the net present value of the original debt by 75 percent, including the past due interest repudiated under the plan and assuming a 10 percent discount rate. These terms provided bondholders much less compensation than plans offered in other developing-nation debt restructurings, which averaged 50 to 60 percent haircuts. Moreover, the plan stipulated that its terms were not subject to negotiation; and on February 9, 2005, the Argentine Congress enacted a law barring the executive branch from reopening the offer or reaching private settlements with non-participating creditors that differed in any way from the original offer.
In March 2005, the Argentine government announced that lenders holding $61.8 billion of the $81.2 billion in outstanding defaulted debt had accepted the offer, for a worldwide participation rate of 76.15 percent. In brief, Argentina exchanged those defaulted bonds, with a face value of $61.8 billion, for three new bonds with a face value of $35.2 billion ($15 billion in par-value bonds, $11.9 billion in discount bonds, and equivalent of $8.3 billion in quasi-par bonds).
The exchange also repudiated all past due interest from the default in December 2001 to the restructuring; and the new bonds carried lower interest rates and shorter maturities than the original bonds they replaced. Indeed the interest rates on the new paper, ranging from 2.08 percent to 5.96 percent, were extraordinarily low for any sovereign debt, much less for loans to a government that had just defaulted."
Robert J. Shapiro & Nam D. Pham:"Discredited – The Impact of Argentina’s Sovereign Debt Default and Debt Restructuring on U.S. Taxpayers and Investors"
http://www.sonecon.c...entina_1006.pdf (p. 13 (p. 14 in the .pdf))
Edit: The discount rate depended on which type of bond and which jurisdiction they were issued under.