Joe Biden on the Falklands conflict, 1982

[on the brink]

One thing I remember him saying is that the Argentines' air tactics seemed like they were from World War 2 -- that is to say, 40 years of date.

Not only the Argentine's tactics were out of date - most of their equipment consisted of WW2 discards.

 

[camberiu]

Not only the Argentine's tactics were out of date - most of their equipment consisted of WW2 discards.

That is not true at all. The Argentine Air force was composed mainly of French Mirages IIIs, American A-4 Skywhawks and Israeli Daggers. All three types of aircraft where quite capable for the era, performed superbly just a decade before at the hands of the Israeli air force during the Yom Kippur conflict and were still in active use by the military forces of their respective countries of origin when the war took place.
The Argentine Navy operated not only the A-4 Skyhawk but also the French Super Etendard, which was at the time the most modern and advanced naval strike craft available, far superior to anything the RAF or the Royal Navy had at the time. Combined with the Exocet missile it carried, it terrorized the British task force and sunk several ships, including a mighty Type 42 destroyer, the HMS Sheffield.
By contrast, the Brits were mostly limited to the Sea Harrier, a then unproven aircraft, with severe performance limitations and that was considered at the time little more than a funky contraption or a science experiment.

 

[FrankPintor]

What happened with the Korean planes the Argentinian air force was supposed to buy?

 

[camberiu]

What happened with the Korean planes the Argentinian air force was supposed to buy?

No money...no honey.

 

[Alpinista]

What happened with the Korean planes the Argentinian air force was supposed to buy?

 

[FrankPintor]

For what it's worth, and people have disagreed with me on this, if Argentina had waited a few more weeks before the attack they would probably have kept the islands. Not only would they have had the runway extension they needed to base planes on the islands, the winter would also have set in making naval operations much more complicated.

I heard second-hand (from an English electronics contractor whose ship sailed in the middle of the night with him unexpectedly still on it) that the tactics used by the Argentinian air force were superb, they were able to confuse the English radar defenses with a combination of very low flying over the sea (to the extent of having their windscreens made opaque by salt spray), hiding planes in the radar shadow of the first plane in an attack and separating at the last moment. However they were at the outside limit of their range and had only minutes over the islands before needing to return.

 

[camberiu]

After the end of the military rule in Brazil, several secret files were made public, including Brazilian intelligence reports on the war. The Brazilian military was completely dumbfounded by the actions of their Argentine counterparts. Early on, the Brazilian military intelligence concluded that if Argentina played their cards right, they had decent chances at keeping the islands, as the British would have only one shot to take it back.

But even if they Argentine held the islands, the main issue is that the Brazilian military simply could not see what the actual desired end game was. So Argentina kept the Island, OK, now what? Do they become a Soviet client state after that and a complete outcast in the South Cone? Because diplomatically and economically speaking, ostracism was almost certain after a victory.

The whole thing made absolutely no sense. It was poorly thought out, poorly executed and had no long term goals. It was all done "in the heat of the moment".

 

[on the brink]

The whole thing made absolutely no sense. It was poorly thought out, poorly executed and had no long term goals. It was all done "in the heat of the moment".

Does any war "make sense"? Apart from the one to stop Hitler, I mean. They all waged by politicians to further their own goals, and started with made up "incidents" designed to inflame the masses.

 

[UK Man]

The Argentine soldiers carried old rifles, and where often issued the wrong ammunition. Their generals sold them out. People I know donated their jewelry to buy equipment, and cases of food for the troops, but they got nothing. It is amazing those poor kids fought at all.....!

However, Argentines love their country with a passion - even those who leave yearn for it. This may be difficult to believe, but it's true. They complain about everything, and grumble incessantly, but they love it.

They were very poorly equipped for the intense cold over in the Falklands. Many had beensuffering from the conditions before the British forces even arrived. They stood no chance. Yet another Argentine fiasco led by an idiot.

 

[Renzi]

After the end of the military rule in Brazil, several secret files were made public, including Brazilian intelligence reports on the war. The Brazilian military was completely dumbfounded by the actions of their Argentine counterparts. Early on, the Brazilian military intelligence concluded that if Argentina played their cards right, they had decent chances at keeping the islands, as the British would have only one shot to take it back.

But even if they Argentine held the islands, the main issue is that the Brazilian military simply could not see what the actual desired end game was. So Argentina kept the Island, OK, now what? Do they become a Soviet client state after that and a complete outcast in the South Cone? Because diplomatically and economically speaking, ostracism was almost certain after a victory.

The whole thing made absolutely no sense. It was poorly thought out, poorly executed and had no long term goals. It was all done "in the heat of the moment".

It made sense for a failing junta to stir up patriotism with a war for the sake of strengthening its rule. In international relations theory, there are many examples where weak or unpopular governments have resorted to this. So the end game more was more likely related to domestic politics. Either way, it was poorly calculated, and its execution was even worse. Also, Galtieri's threat to seek help from the Soviets essentially assured that the US would intervene sooner or later, even if indirectly.