I agree with both your and Antipodean's comments. I was first in Argentina in the late 1990s and it was not cheap. I would add a few points re: dollarization and the convertibility analogy.
My understanding or recollection is that convertibility initially worked well to reduce inflation drastically together with liberalization of the economy and trade that attracted foreign investment and economic growth was impressive. This was also successfully financed by the Menem government with sale of state assets. However, in addition to surrendering control over fiscal policy by introducing the currency board, Argentina was never able to finance convertibility through the taxation system alone because the government never really tackled the informal/black market economy by eliminating market distorting subsidies/policies and reforming the tax system to bring in revenue that would be sufficient to ensure sufficient foreign reserves to support the convertibility policy.
There is a good argument that even with such reforms, sustaining the convertibility model in the long term was doomed to failure given the effect it had on making Argentine exports uncompetitive. Eventually, when the IMF stopped funding what was likely an unsustainable program in 2001, the crash was inevitable.
Convertibility was another example of an Argentine government applying a magic solution that worked for some time, longer and more successfully than most, but that contained within it the seeds of its own destruction by surrendering control over fiscal policy and attempting to insulate Argentina's economy from unavaidobale external shocks (like the Mexican, Southeast Asian and Russian currency/financial crises) occurring in the mid to late 1990s, that will inevitably impact an export oriented economy of Argentina's size.
I fear dollarization may follow a similar path; short to medium term success and long term disaster. I don't think there is a panacea to Argentina's economic woes without addressing the market distorting policies of the extensive subsidies and artificial exchange rates that have been the Kirchnerism's panacea that are similarly unsustainable in the long term as present day inflation/devaluation demonstrates.
Whether Milei's approach will address the real problems of Argentina's economy and whether the population will accept the pain of structural reform that addresses Argentina's real problems that distort its internal market and export earnings is a question I cannot answer. But I fear that "dollarization" will turn out to be another magic solution that will fail in the long term with consquences that repeat the cycle of 2001 to 2003 and then the past 20 years.
