Argentina once had a surprisingly robust shipbuilding industry, but now just buys second-hand ships, which are mysteriously offered on amazingly attractive terms.
This PDF document is a very detailed comparison of shipbuilding in Argentina and Brazil, also showing US figures as a baseline in some graphs. Basically shipbuilding in Argentina has been flatlined since 1980.
Since your original PDF superficially contrasted Brazil building submarines while Argentina buys low end off-shore patrol vessels, let me tell you a little story about the South American submarine race, which has broad parallels with the de-industrialization of Argentina, which you bale at least partially on malicious foreign intervention.
Back in 2019, it was
announced that the Brazilian Navy would transfer four of its domestically build, German designed Type 209 submarines to the Armada Argentina. As the Brazilian
Type 209 subs are gradually replaced by the new (also domestically build) Riachuelo class, they will be transferred to Argentina. This is an unexpected and rather ironic end to a submarine building race between the two countries that started in the late 70s. In many ways, it is the retelling of the tale of the the Hare vs the Tortoise.
It all started back in the late 70s, when Brazil and Argentina, both governed by right-wing military juntas, were bitter geo-political regional rivals jockeying for dominance over the South Atlantic. Argentina decided to embark on an incredibly ambitious program to acquire the know-how and capability to build advanced diesel-electric submarines domestically, with the ultimate goal of eventually developing its own native nuclear sub. For that, Argentina reached out to a shipyard in then West Germany and laid out a series of requirements for what would become the
TR-1700 project. The TR-1700 class was the largest and most ambitious non-nuclear submarines of the era, vastly outclassing any other sub deployed South of the Equator at the time. Even the West German Navy, the country where the submarines were being designed, did not possess vessels as capable as the TR-1700 at the time.
The idea was that the first two subs of the class would be build in Germany and the other four would be build in Argentina. It was a very aggressive and audacious plan. The TR-1700 was an extremely complex and advanced piece of engineering, requiring very advanced metallurgy, machinery and manufacturing techniques to be build. It was also very expensive. But the Argentines felt confided that they could tackle the challenge.
Seeing their regional arch rivals embark in such a project that would give them the ability to dominate the South Atlantic, the Brazilian government had no choice but to also start a domestic submarine program. However, lacking the audacity and self confidence of its neighbors, and having a long tradition of steady gradual progress instead of attempts of leaps of engineering, Brazil opted for a much more conservative approach: The domestic production of the much more simple German designed Type-209 submarine. Unlike the TR-1700, the 209 was much less ambitious, being half of the size of its Argentine counterpart and not nearly as advanced. It was also a tested and proven design, and well within the industrial (and financial) capabilities possessed by Brazil at the time. If the TR-1700 was to be considered the equivalent of the Porsche of the conventional submarines, the 209 was the Toyota Camry. However, in the early 80s, a massive economic crisis, triggered by Mexico's Debt default, devastated the economies of Latin America. Government programs budget were slashed to the bone and the submarine programs of both Brazil and Argentina were heavily affected.
Because the Brazilian program was less ambitious, cheaper and required less development of new manufacturing technologies, even with severe budget cuts, the Brazilian Navy was able to slow down the project enough without having to kill it. Despite many delays due to budget cuts, eventually the first Type 209 submarine for the Brazilian Navy was build in Germany. The others were successfully build locally at the Arsenal da Marinha, in Rio de Janeiro, giving Brazil true know how on submarine manufacturing. Based on the acquired knowledge, a new more advanced class of submarines (
The Tikuna Class) was developed domestically and build without foreign oversight or assistance. Brazil now had the know-how of advanced conventional submarine manufacturing techniques. Those techniques are the basis being applied to Brazil's future nuclear powered submarine, the
SN Alvaro de Alberto. Meanwhile, the Argentine side did not fare so well. The combination of the economic crisis with the overall high price and complexity of their program meant that even putting the program into basic life support was too costly for Argentina and ultimately doomed the entire program. The ARA Santa Fe and Santiago del Estero which were meant to be build domestically in Argentina were left unfinished on an local shipyard and only the two subs built in Germany were delivered: The ARA Santa Cruz and ARA San Juan. Worse, the acquisition of fabrication know-how did not take place and Argentina did not developed the much desired technological capability of designing and building submarines domestically.
And now, 40 years later, Argentina will be receiving used Type-209 submarines from Brazil, to replace the subs that were originally expected to compete against, the TR-1700.
I doubt that anyone from either country involved in these projects back then expected this to be the outcome of the submarine race of the late 70s and 80s in the South Atlantic.
By the way, the journeys of The Fábrica Argentina de Aviones SA (FAdeA) and EMBRAER follow a very similar story, with very similar tropes.
